

## Message Text

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ACTION IO-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AID-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04

H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 /075 W

----- 056013

R 200721Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5322

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USUN NEW YORK 221

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BUDAPEST 0551

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORG, PFOR, HU

SUBJ: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS: HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION AND POLICIES

REF: (A) STATE 037591, (B) BUDAPEST 0391, (C) 75 BUDAPEST

3853 (NOTAL), (D) 75 USUN 6169 (NOTAL), 8E 75 BUDAPEST

2739 (NOTAL)

1. AMBASSADOR HAS DESIGNATED EMBASSY POLOFF KEITH SMITH  
AS MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS OFFICER.

2. AS DECIDEDLY JUNIOR MEMBER OF WARSAW PACT, ECONOMICALLY  
AND POLITICALLY DEPENDENT ON MOSCOW (SEE REF B), HUNGARIAN  
LEADERSHIP DELIBERATELY AND ROUTINELY ADHERES TO SOVIET  
POLICIES IN ALL INTERNATIONAL FORUMS. THERE IS NO  
DEVIATION WHATEVER BETWEEN HUNGARIAN AND SOVIET VOTING  
PATTERNS ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE IN UN. NOR IS THERE  
ANY PRESENT PROSPECT THAT HIGH LEVEL, REPEATED AND WELL-  
REASONED REPRESENTATIONS BY U.S. WILL ALTER HUNGARIAN  
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POSITIONS ON ISSUES WHICH MOSCOW CONSIDERS IMPORTANT.

3. THIS EMBASSY DID, HOWEVER, RECENTLY SUCCEED IN CONVINCING PRESIDENT LOSONCZI, FOREIGN MINISTER PUJA AND OTHER GOH OFFICIALS THAT IT IS MISTAKE TO ANTAGONIZE U.S. NEEDLESSLY OVER ISSUES SUCH AS STATUS OF PURETO RICO, WHICH ARE OF PRIME IMPORTANCE TO AMERICAN INTERESTS BUT OF ONLY PERIPHERAL SIGNIFICANCE TO HUNGARY'S ALLIES (SEE REF C).

4. HUNGARY'S PRIMARY MULTILATERAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES ARE TO INCREASE ITS INTERNATIONAL RESPECTABILITY. JANOS KADAR AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE STILL STRIVING TO SHED PARIAH STATUS THEY ACQUIRED IN 1956: HUNGARY'S EXCLUSION FROM ACTIVE UN PARTICIPATION IN LATE 50'S IS STILL VIVIDLY REMEMBERED. WITHIN CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY USSR, GOH ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE ITS VISIBILITY IN ALL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND TO PUSH ITS OWN CANDIDATES FOR PRESTIGIOUS AND INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS. ON OTHER HAND, HUNGARY MAINTAINS MEMBERSHIP IN SPECIALIZED ORGANIZATIONS LIKE GATT FOR PURELY ECONOMIC REASONS. IT IS TRADING NATION AND IT NEEDS GREATER ACCESS TO FOREIGN MARKETS.

5. HUNGARY'S INTERESTS ARE BOUND UP WITH ITS DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN CLOSE TIES WITH USSR, AND WITH OTHER "SOCIALIST STATES." MAGYARS, ALTHOUGH SOMETIMES RELUCTANT AND EMBARRASSED, SIMPLY DO NOT DARE OPPOSE GENERAL POLICY LINE DECIDED BY USSR AND SECONDED AT CAUCUSES OF WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES. THUS, AT 1975 UNGA HUNGAR VOTED IN FAVOR OF RESOLUTION ON ZIONISM, DESPITE FACT THAT ISRAEL HAS GREAT DEAL OF SILENT SUPPORT FRM MAN-IN-STREET. GOH OFFICIALS WERE OBVIOUSLY EMBARRASSED AND UNCOMFORTABLE. BUDAPEST PRESS DID NOT EVEN MENTION THAT UNGA HAD PASSED ZIONISM RESOLUTION UNTIL ALMOST WEEK HAD PASSED; AND THEN ISSUE WAS TREATED SLIGHTLY. AGAIN IT WAS CLEAR THAT HUNGARY HAVING LITTLE ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL MUCLE, EXERTS LITTLE OR NO DIRECT INFLUENCE OVER WARSAW PACT POLICIES IN MAJOR INTERNATIONAL FORUMS.

6. ALL GOH DELS AT ALL MAJOR INERNATIONAL MEETINGS  
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OPERATE ON SHORT LEASH AND MUST HAVE INSTRUCTIONS FROM BUDAPEST BEFORE VOTING ON IMPORTANT ISSUES -- ALTHOUGH WE WOULD NOT DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY THAT HUNGARIAN VOTE HAS ON CERTAIN OCCASIONS BEEN "RECTIFIED" ON SPOT BY INSTRUCTIONS FROM SOVIET REP. NEVERTHELESS, GOH IS EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS; AND WE BELIEVE THAT IN MOST CASES HUNGARIAN REPS WOULD DELAY VOTING RATHER THAN RISK DEVIATING FROM APPROVED LINE. WE KNOW OF NO INSTANCE IN

WHICH GOH DEL VOTED CONTRARY TO GOVERNMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ARE COURTEOUS, POLITELY ATTENTIVE BUT ONLY MODESTLY RECEPTIVE TO REPRESENTATIONS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES. ONCE USSR HAS DECIDED POLICY ISSUE AND HAS "CONSULTED" WITH ITS WARSAW PACT ALLIES, ONE CAN EXPECT GOH REPRESENTATIVES AND NEWS MEDIA TO FOLLOW THAT LINE OBEDIENTLY. HUNGARIANS HAVE NO REAL SWAY OR SAY IN THE EE CONSULTATIONS; SO ONE CANNOT EXPECT BUDAPEST TO EXERT ANY MODERATING INFLUENCE ON MOSCOW.

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AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
USUN NEW YORK 222

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BUDAPEST 0551

8. WHAT ONE CAN DO -- WITHIN FAIRLY NARROW LIMITS BECAUSE U.S. IS SO REMOTE AND ITS LEVERAGE IS SO SLIGHT -- IS TO TRY TO INDUCE HUNGARIANS TO BEHAVE BETTER ON THOSE TWO, THREE OR FOUR ISSUES THAT ARE OF OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE TO WASHINGTON. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE USSR HAS DECIDED ON A GIVEN COURSE OF ACTION, ONE MUST EXPECT THAT HUNGARY WILL FOLLOW OR TAG ALONG. BUT ONE CAN SUGGEST AND OFFER COUNSEL, VIZ: IF "SOCIALIST STATES" HAVE IN THEIR

OWN NATIONAL SELF-INTEREST DECIDED TO SUPPORT (OR OPPOSE)  
A GIVEN RESOLUTION, U.S. RESPECTS HUNGARY'S SOVEREIGN  
RIGHT TO DO SO EVEN THOUGH THAT ACTION WILL DAMAGE U.S.-  
HUNGARIAN RELATIONS. IDEALLY, FROM THE U.S. VIEWPOINT,  
ONE WOULD HOPE THAT HUNGARY MIGHT ABSTAIN FROM VOTING  
OR BE ABSENT WHEN VOTE OCCURS. IF THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE,  
ONE COULD HOPE THAT HUNGARIAN REPRESENTATIVE WOULD SIMPLY  
VOTE AND MAKE NO STATEMENT, LEAVING THE DEBATE AND UN-  
FORTUNATE PUBLICITY TO OTHERS. IF DEBATE TAKES COURSE  
THAT NECESSITATES STATEMENT BY HUNGARIAN REPRESENTATIVE,  
ONE WOULD HOPE THAT HE MIGHT SPEAK LATE IN THE PROCEEDINGS  
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AND ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH REMARKS MADE BY OTHER "SOCIALIST"  
COLLEAGUES RATHER THAN SPEAK AT LENGTH. ABOVE AND  
BEYOND ALL ELSE, ONE WOULD HOPE THAT HUNGARIAN REPRE-  
SENTATIVES WILL -- LIKE THEIR AMERICAN COLLEAGUES --  
ADDRESS THE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION AT ISSUE AND REFRAIN  
FROM THE VITUPERATIVE DEBATE AND PERSONAL INVECTIVE  
THAT BRING BACK SOUR MEMORIES OF COLD WAR.

9. WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN EVIDENCE THAT ON ONE ISSUE  
OF PERIPHERAL IMPORTANCE TO HUNGARY, FIRM BUT QUIET  
REPRESENTATION ON PART OF U.S. CAN TEMPER POSITION OF  
GOH. JUST SUCH UNPUBLICIZED REPRESENTATIONS TO HIGH  
GOH OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT LOSONCZI, APPEAR  
TO HAVE RESULTED IN HUNGARIANS REFUSING CUBAN REQUEST  
TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF PUERTO RICAN SOCIALIST PARTY DURING  
30TH UNGA (REF D). DURING AMBASSADOR'S AUG 75 MEETING  
WITH FORMIN PUJA ON PUERTO RICO, THE LATTER REMARKED THAT  
IT WAS PERHAPS FORTUNATE THAT HUNGARY WAS NOT MEMBER  
OF UN DECOLONIZATION COMMITTEE. THUS HUNGARIANS ARE  
AWARE OF NEED TO AVOID GOING OUT OF THEIR WAY TO  
ANTAGONIZE US (REF E), PARTICULARLY WHEN AN ISSUE IS  
VITAL TO WASHINGTON AND OUR REPRESENTATIONS ARE AT  
SUFFICIENTLY HIGH LEVEL. NEVERTHELESS, HUNGARY IS  
FAITHFUL FOLLOWER OF MOSCOW AND THAT FACT IS ALWAYS  
UPPERMOST IN MINDS OF EVERY MAGYAR OFFICIAL.  
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